Compiled By Chiamaka J Nnadigwe
| INDICATOR | LATEST POSITION | |
|---|---|---|
Total Market Obligations |
N456.5bn | |
Additional Debt Accumulated Under ASIASI Engineering Ltd |
N118.6BN | |
Owed to NBET(Nigerian Bulk Electricity Trading)The Manager of Electricity pool in the Nigeria Electricity Supply Industry |
N415.5bn | |
Owed to NISO(The Nigerian Independent System Operator)Promotes Reliable, transparent and efficient transmission in line with global standards |
N41bn | |
2025 Market Invoice PaidBy Kaduna Disco |
41.93% | |
ATC&C lossesAggregate Technical, Commercial and Collection |
71.88% | |
Metering Coverage |
34.42% | |
2025 Billing Efficiency |
61.56% | |
2025 Collection Efficiency |
46.69% | |
2025 CAPEX(Capital Expenditures) |
N2.48bn | |
REQUIRED CAPEX(Capital Expenditures) |
N24.51bn |
Far beyond the N600 million tax dispute and the N2.9 billion Government House electricity bill of 2024, As of August 10, 2026, Kaduna Electricity Distribution Plc (KAEDC) is again under direct regulatory intervention and this time the numbers are dramatically larger.
What exactly went wrong between the promise of a private-sector turnaround in 2024 and NERC's decision, just two years later, only for NERC to take regulatory control again? When NERC approved the acquisition of 60% of Kaduna Electric by ASI Engineering Limited in July 2024, the company was already deeply distressed. Its debt at the time was reported at roughly N110 billion, and the transaction was presented as an opportunity to inject fresh capital, improve infrastructure and restore reliable electricity distribution. But the expected turnaround did not materialize.
On August 10, 2026, the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) dissolved the board of Kaduna Electric under Order No. NERC/2026/086, citing severe financial insolvency, prolonged market and regulatory defaults, inadequate investment and weak operational and commercial performance.
NERC's figures show that KAEDC's 71.88% ATC&C losses were perhaps the biggest structural problem. In simple terms, the company could account for only about 28.2% of the electricity it received for delivery to customers during the 2025 review period. That created a vicious cycle:
Electricity purchased, huge technical/commercial losses, less energy successfully billed, poor collections, inadequate cash flow, inability to pay NBET/NISO, mounting debt, inadequate investment, more losses.
The investment problem. This is particularly important when assessing what went wrong after the 2024 takeover. NERC says KAEDC invested only N2.48 billion in 2025, against a minimum capital expenditure requirement of N24.51 billion just about 10% of the required investment.
At the same time, metering remained very weak. Meter coverage was only about 34.42% at the end of 2025, meaning a large proportion of customers remained without adequate metering. That matters because poor metering can make accurate billing and collection extremely difficult. Combined with technical losses, energy theft, commercial leakages and weak collection, the DisCo can end up owing the electricity market even when it is still billing customers.
So, why did the debt become so large?
There isn't one single reason. NERC's latest findings point to a combination of structural and management failures.
1. The company inherited a huge debt burden The 2024 investor transaction did not begin with a clean balance sheet. Kaduna Electric was already carrying substantial obligations before ASI Engineering assumed operational control. So the new investor inherited a fundamentally distressed utility.
2. The turnaround did not generate enough new investment The critical question is: Was the new ownership able to put enough money into the network to change the economics of the business?NERC's 2025 CAPEX figure according to the table above suggests the answer was NO. A requirement of N24.51 billion against actual investment of N2.48 billion leaves a massive infrastructure-investment gap.
3. Energy losses were extraordinarily high: A 71.88% ATC&C loss rate is devastating for a distribution company. It means that for every 100 units of electricity entering the system, only about 28 units were effectively accounted for at the customer end.
Those losses can arise from a combination of:
Faulty or overloaded infrastructure, technical losses on distribution networks, electricity theft, bypassed meters, inaccurate or estimated billing, weak revenue collection, poor commercial controls.
NERC specifically linked the poor remittance performance to these very high losses.
4. The company could not remit enough money to the market, In 2025, KAEDC paid only 41.93% of its adjusted market invoices. NERC put the resulting market shortfall at approximately N46.71 billion is crucial because a DisCo is effectively the financial bridge between electricity consumers and the wider electricity market. If it collects too little from customers but still has to pay for electricity supplied into its network, the unpaid balance accumulates.
5. The wider Nigerian electricity market is itself financially stressed: This is an important part of the story. Kaduna Electric's problems cannot be viewed entirely in isolation from Nigeria's electricity-market structure. DisCos operate in a chain involving generators, NBET, the transmission/system operation structure and customers. When tariffs, collection, energy availability, losses and market settlements do not align, DisCos can accumulate enormous liabilities.
However, NERC's latest intervention suggests that Kaduna's performance had deteriorated beyond what the regulator considered commercially sustainable, particularly because of the extremely high losses, inadequate investment and repeated payment defaults.
And what about that 2024 N2.9bn Government House debt?
That episode is actually useful because it illustrates the cash-flow problem from the other side.
In August 2024, Kaduna Electric disconnected the Kaduna State Government House and other government facilities, saying the government owed N2.943 billion, including about N1.167 billion for January–July 2024 alone. (But there was an important dispute over that figure.
The Kaduna Power Supply Company (KAPSCO), a state government agency, rejected Kaduna Electric's N2.9 billion claim as unfounded. KAPSCO said the state had verified and paid N7.315 billion against bills covering earlier periods and alleged that some of the DisCo's billing exceeded NERC's applicable caps.
The dispute was subsequently reported as resolved after meetings between the state government and Kaduna Electric.
So, journalistically, I would not present the N2.9 billion as an uncontested debt. Say "Kaduna Electric alleged that the state government owed N2.9 billion" and then present the KAPSCO response.
The same caution applies to the N600 million tax dispute. KADIRS said the liability related to 2015–2022 and that it had obtained a court order to seal the company's premises. Kaduna Electric subsequently disputed the tax claim. The biggest twist: NERC has now intervened againNERC has now dissolved the KAEDC board and appointed an interim board of special directors, with Dr Abdullahi Garba as chairman. Dr Abubakar Umar Hashidu has been appointed administrator for an initial six months.
NERC also says Afrexim Bank will coordinate a transparent 12-month competitive process to find a replacement core investor. Electricity distribution in Kaduna and the other areas within KAEDC's franchise is expected to continue during the transition.
That means the question has changed from: "Can ASI Engineering turn Kaduna Electric around?" , to "Can NERC find an investor capable of rescuing a DisCo with N456.5 billion in market obligations?"
| Year | Kaduna Electric Chronology |
|---|---|
| PRE 2024 | Kaduna Electric Already Heavily indebted |
| July 2024 |
ASI Engineering Gets 60% Stake |
| August 2024 |
N2.9bn Government House Electricity Dispute
|
| 2025 |
71.88% ATC&C Losses, only 41.93% Market Remittance
|
| May 2026 |
Additional N118.6bn Market Debt Accumulated Under ASI |
| August 10, 2026 |
NERC Dissolves Board |
| NOW |
With Total Market Obligations N456.5bn
|

